has entertain'd of himself, and his contempt of all others...

This is the
more remarkable, that in the two last species of animals, the pride always
attends the beauty, and is discover'd in the male only. The vanity and
emulation of nightingales in singing have been commonly remark'd; as
likewise that of horses in swiftness, of hounds in sagacity and smell, of
the bull and cock in strength, and of every other animal in his particular
excellency. Add to this, that every species of creatures, which approach so
often to man, as to familiarize themselves with him, show an evident
pride in his approbation, and are pleas'd with his praises and caresses,
independent of every other consideration. Nor are they the caresses of
every one without distinction, which give them this vanity, but those
principally of the persons they know and love; in the same manner as
that passion is excited in mankind. All these are evident proofs, that
pride and humility are not merely human passions, but extend
themselves over the whole animal creation.
The causes of these passions are likewise much the same in beasts as in
us, making a just allowance for our superior knowledge and
understanding. Thus animals have little or no sense of virtue or vice; they
quickly lose sight of the relations of blood; and are incapable of that of
right and property: For which reason the causes of their pride and
humility must lie solely in the body, and can never be plac'd either in the
mind or external objects. But so far as regards the body, the same
qualities cause pride in the animal as in the human kind; and `tis on
beauty, strength, swiftness or some other useful or agreeable quality that
this passion is always founded.
The next question is, whether, since those passions are the same, and
arise from the same causes thro' the whole creation, the manner, in
which the causes operate, be also the same. According to all rules of
analogy, this is justly to be expected; and if we find upon trial, that the
explication of these phaenomena, which we make use of in one species,
will not apply to the rest, we may presume that that explication, however
specious, is in reality without foundation.
In order to decide this question, let us consider, that there is evidently
the same relation of ideas, and deriv'd from the same causes, in the
minds of animals as in those of men. A dog, that has hid a bone, often
forgets the place; but when brought to it, his thought passes easily to
what he formerly conceal'd, by means of the contiguity, which produces a
relation among his ideas. In like manner, when he has been heartily beat
in any place, he will tremble on his approach to it, even tho' he discover
no signs of any present danger. The effects of resemblance are not so
remarkable; but as that relation makes a considerable ingredient in
causation, of which all animals shew so evident a judgment, we may
conclude that the three relations of resemblance, contiguity and
causation operate in the same manner upon beasts as upon human
creatures.
There are also instances of the relation of impressions, sufficient to
convince us, that there is an union of certain affections with each other
in the inferior species of creatures as well as in the superior, and that
their minds are frequently convey'd thro' a series of connected emotions.
A dog, when elevated with joy, runs naturally into love and kindness,
whether of his master or of the sex. In like manner, when full of pain and
sorrow, he becomes quarrelsome and illnatur'd; and that passion; which
at first was grief, is by the smallest occasion converted into anger.
Thus all the internal principles, that are necessary in us to produce either pride or humility, are commcm to all creaturn; and since the causes,
which excite these passions, are likewise the same, we may justly
conclude, that these causes operate after the same manner thro' the
whole animal creation. My hypothesis Is so simple, and supposes so little
reflection and judgment, that `tis applicable to every sensible creature;
which must not only be allow'd to be a convincing proof of its veracity,
but, I am confident, will be found an objection to every other system.




PART II Of love and hatred SECT. I Of the object and causes of love and hatred `Tis altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of love
and hatred; and that because they produce merely a simple impression,
without any mixture or composition. Twou'd be as unnecessary to
attempt any description of them, drawn from their nature, origin, causes
and objects; and that both because these are the subjects of our present
enquiry, and because these passions of themselves are sufficiently known
from our common feeling and experience. This we have already observ'd
concerning pride and humility, and here repeat it concerning love and
hatred; and indeed there is so great a resemblance betwixt these two sets
of passions, that we shall be oblig'd to begin with a kind of abridgment of
our reasonings concerning the former, in order to explain the latter.
As the immediate object of pride and humility is self or that identical
person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately
conscious; so the object of love and hatred is some other person, of
whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious. This is
sufficiently evident from experience. Our love and hatred are always
directed to some sensible being external to us; and when we talk of self-
love, `tis not in a proper sense, nor has the sensation it produces any
thing in common with that tender emotion which is excited by a friend
or mistress. `Tis the same case with hatred. We may be mortified by our
own faults and follies; but never feel any anger or hatred. except from the
injuries of others.
But tho' the object of love and hatred be always some other person, `tis
plain that the object is not, properly speaking, the cause of these
passions, or alone sufficient to excite them. For since love and hatred are
directly contrary in their sensation, and have the same object in
common, if that object were also their cause, it wou'd produce these
opposite passions in an equal degree; and as they must, from the very
first moment, destroy each other, none of them wou'd ever be able to
make its appearance. There must, therefore, be some cause different
from the object.
If we consider the causes of love and hatred, we shall find they are very
much diversify'd, and have not many things in common. The virtue,
knowledge, wit, good sense, good humour of any person, produce love
and esteem; as the opposite qualities, hatred and contempt. The same
passions arise from bodily accomplishments, such as beauty, force,
swiftness, dexterity; and from their contraries; as likewise from the